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When	 individuals	 post	 their	 photographs,	 shopping	 habits,	 and	 other	 personal	 data	 to	 social	
networking	sites	they	are	tracked	and	potentially	harassed	by	the	scores	of	corporate	actors	with	
access	 to	 their	 data.	 As	 governments	 worldwide	 have	 sprung	 into	 action	 to	 address	 this	
regulatory	problem,	industry	groups	and	consumer	advocates	have	also	mobilized.	To	give	but	
one	 example,	 in	 the	 past	 three	 years,	 the	 world’s	 leading	 social	 networking	 company	 has	
defended	 lawsuits	 claiming	 unfair	 consumer	 tracking	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 European	
Union	(EU),	has	settled	administrative	and	civil	enforcement	actions	brought	by	the	U.S.	Federal	
Trade	 Commission,	 the	 Belgian	Data	 Protection	Authority,	 and	 the	Hamburg	Data	 Protection	
Authority,	and	has	lobbied	for	looser	consumer-tracking	rules	in	the	European	Union,	the	United	
States,	Latin	American	countries,	and	the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	system.1	Although	
there	are	 substantial	 limits	on	what	 social	 networking	 sites	 can	do	with	personal	data	 in	 the	
1 In	re:	Facebook	Internet	Tracking	Litigation,	844	F.	Supp.	2d	1374	(J.D.M.L.	2012);	Case	C-362/14,	Schrems	v.	Data	
Protection	Commissioner,	2013	WL	614CJ0362	(Oct.	6,	2015);	In	re	Facebook,	Inc.,	FTC	File	No.	092	3184,	No.	C-4365	
(F.T.C.	 July	 27,	 2012);	Commissie	 voor	de	bescherming	 van	de	persoonlijke	 levenssfeer	 (Belgian	Data	Protection	






(2012);	 Camila	 Tobón,	 Data	 Privacy	 Laws	 in	 Latin	 America:	 An	 Overview,	 44	 International	 Law	 News	 1	 (2015)	
(reviewing	laws	of	Argentina,	Chile,	Colombia,	Costa	Rica,	Mexico,	Nicaragua,	Paraguay,	Peru,	and	Uruguay);	Asia-










to	 cancer	 and	 other	 types	 of	 health	 concerns.	 The	 regulatory	 battle	 over	whether	 to	 ban	 or	
restrict	 their	 use	 is	 occurring	 in	 legislatures,	 administrative	 agencies,	 and	 international	
organizations	 throughout	 the	 world.	 Multinational	 corporations,	 members	 of	 the	 scientific	
community,	and	environmental	and	consumer	groups	have	sparred	over	parabens	in	a	vast	array	
of	 venues—to	 name	 just	 a	 few,	 the	 U.S.	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency,	 the	 European	
Commission,	 the	 Danish	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Environment	








the	 globe	 and	 therefore	 regulators	 everywhere	 are	 called	 upon	 to	 assess	 their	 safety.	 The	
process,	 however,	 by	 which	 these	 national	 and	 international	 jurisdictions	 decide	 common	
regulatory	problems	bears	 little	 resemblance	 to	 the	domestic	 regulatory	process.	There	 is	no	




















private	 relations,	 constitutional	 law	as	 the	basic	 framework	 for	 the	organization	of	 the	 state,	
administrative	law	to	govern	public	administration,	criminal	law	for	the	police	and	prosecutors,	
and	 international	 law	 for	 inter-state	 relations	 in	 the	 international	 sphere.	 Comparative	 law,	
devoted	to	understanding	the	law	of	multiple	jurisdictions,	was	subdivided	into	these	different	
categories	 and	was	 almost	 exclusively	 focused	 on	 private	 law,	 in	 particular	 the	 contract	 law	
essential	 to	 the	 global	 commerce	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 centuries.	What	 is	more,	
comparative	law	was	segregated	from	international	law,	conceived	as	operating	in	isolation	from	
the	internal	law	of	the	nation	state.		
The	 global	 regulatory	 process,	 a	 quintessentially	 twenty-first-century	 phenomenon,	
defies	 these	 nineteenth-century	 disciplinary	 boundaries.	 To	 begin	 with,	 regulation	 is	 an	
inherently	instrumental	activity	that	is	undertaken	by	a	variety	of	public,	and	increasingly	private,	




places	a	 rule	such	as	a	ban	on	consumer	 tracking	 is	enforced	 largely	by	criminal	prosecutors,	
under	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 procedure,	while	 in	 other	 places	 administrative	 proceedings,	










The	 purpose	 of	 this	 introduction	 and	 the	 volume	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 to	 overcome	 these	
traditional	 disciplinary	 limitations	 and	 to	 set	 down	 the	 foundations	 for	 a	 new	 field	 of	 legal	
research	capable	of	illuminating	the	global	regulatory	process—comparative	law	and	regulation.	
To	 begin	 with,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 set	 forth	 a	 working	 definition	 of	 regulation.	 The	 concept	 of	
regulation	is	used	in	a	variety	of	ways	in	the	social	scientific	and	legal	literatures	(Kahn,	1970:	11;	
Selznick,	1985:	363–64;	Black,	2002:	1).	Since	the	purpose	of	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	
regulation	 is	 to	 cover	 the	 great	 variety	 of	 jurisdictions	 that	 interact	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	
process,	the	definition	proposed	here	is	broad:	regulation	is	a	form	of	governance	designed	to	
address	 complex	 social,	 environmental,	 and	 economic	 problems	 that	 relies	 heavily	 on	 rules,	
enforced	against	market	actors,	and	administrative	authorities.	This	definition	recognizes	that	
administrative	authorities	are	pivotal,	but	not	exclusive,	institutions	in	the	regulatory	process	and	
that	 regulatory	 output	 is	 fashioned	 also	 by	 other	 institutions,	 including	 legislatures,	 public	
prosecutors,	 courts,	 and	 private	 bodies.	 The	 definition	 employed	 here	 also	 identifies	 legally	
binding	 rules,	 enforced	 against	 market	 actors,	 as	 the	 typical	 technique	 of	 regulation	 but	
acknowledges	that	standards	can	be	contained	in	other	types	of	instruments,	such	as	soft	law,	
and	that	standards	can,	in	some	policy	areas,	be	applied	against	civil	society	and	public	actors.			
Comparative	 law	 and	 regulation	 investigates	 the	 law	 that	 applies	 to	 this	 regulatory	
function.	It	covers	all	the	law	of	the	regulatory	process,	regardless	of	the	branch	of	law	to	which	












established	 legal	 discipline,	 it	 is	 situated	 in	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law.	 That	 is	 because	
comparative	law	has	developed	a	series	of	theoretical	and	analytical	tools,	albeit	in	the	context	
of	 private	 law,	 that	 are	 particularly	 apt	 for	 understanding	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process.	 The	
discipline	of	comparative	law	was	born	in	the	era	of	the	globalization	of	commerce	and	has	been	
devoted	in	large	part	to	building	the	intellectual	apparatus	necessary	to	understand	commercial	
transactions	 that	 straddle	 multiple	 jurisdictions	 (Zimmermann,	 2008).	 The	 globalization	 of	
regulation	shares	many	of	the	same	attributes	as	the	earlier	globalization	and	therefore	the	lines	




political	processes;	and	 the	prescription	of	new	 law	by	political	and	 legal	operators	based	on	























corporations,	 by	 contrast,	 are	 likely	 to	 draw	 inspiration	 from	 the	 U.S.	 system	 of	 chemicals	
regulation	to	oppose	licensing	for	parabens	and	other	chemicals	in	Latin	America.			
Within	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law,	 there	 are	 three	 lines	 of	 inquiry	 that	 can,	 with	
significant	adaptation	and	development,	shed	light	on	each	of	these	key	characteristics	of	the	
global	regulatory	process.	Classifications	serve	to	describe	and	chart	legal	variation	globally	and	
are	 an	 important	 tool	 for	understanding	 the	different	 legal	 responses	 generated	by	 common	
policy	problems	(David	and	Brierly,	1978;	Zweigert	and	Kötz,	1998).	The	causal	theory	of	 legal	
transplants	 (Watson,	1974),	also	known	as	diffusion	 in	 the	 social	 scientific	 literature	 (Dobbin,	
Simmons,	 and	 Garrett,	 2007),	 points	 to	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 regulatory	 institutions,	
principles,	and	procedures	are	likely	to	converge	across	the	multiple	jurisdictions	involved	in	the	














are	 central	 to	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	 regulation.	 In	 presenting	 classifications,	 legal	










one	 in	 particular—power—has	 been	 neglected	 in	 the	 existing	 transplant	 literature.	 	 And,	 in	
unpacking	the	functional	method	of	legal	prescription,	the	chapter	dwells	on	what	is	generally	
the	 last	 stage	 of	 the	 comparative	 analysis,	 that	 is,	 recommending	 a	 new	 domestic	 law	 or	
international	 legal	 instrument	 based	 on	 the	 “better”	 law	 that	 has	 been	 revealed	 by	 the	
comparative	survey.	This	chapter	underscores	the	need	for	comparative	analysis	to	be	explicit	as	
to	the	normative	criteria	that	are	used	to	identify	the	law	of	one	jurisdiction	as	superior	to	the	




























Comparative	 administrative	 law	 is	 focused	 on	 bureaucratic	 authority,	 broadly	 speaking.	 The	
object	of	comparison	is	the	institution	of	public	administration	and	the	national	laws	that	govern	









are	 governed	 by	 constitutional	 law;	 public	 prosecutors,	 who	 pursue	 criminal	 actions	 for	






is	 largely	 synonymous	 with	 regulation	 because	 of	 the	 early	 use	 of	 regulation	 to	 govern	 the	





organization	 of	 government,	 which	 leaves	most	 responsibility	 for	 functions	 such	 as	 land-use	
planning	to	state	and	local	government	and	separate	subfields	of	law	(Breyer	et	al.,	2011).	But	
the	American	experience	is	unique.	In	most	other	jurisdictions,	the	opposite	is	the	case:	the	work	
of	 administration	 is	 only	 in	 small	 part	 regulation	 and	 instead	 is	 focused	 on	 providing	 basic	






global	 context.	 Comparing	 administrative	 law	 falls	 into	 the	 trap	 of	 comparing	 the	 proverbial	
apples	and	oranges	(Dannemann,	2008;	Valcke,	2012).	At	best,	comparative	administrative	law	
risks	being	relatively	uninformative	on	how	the	law	governs	the	regulatory	function	in	different	




















Global	administrative	 law	studies	 the	numerous	 international	administrative	bodies	 that	have	
mushroomed	 over	 the	 past	 decades	 (Kingsbury,	 Krisch,	 and	 Stewart,	 2005;	 Cassese,	 2016).	
Broadly	 speaking,	 global	 administrative	 law	 is	 the	 international	 counterpart	 of	 comparative	





level	 as	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 the	 national	 level	 and	 to	 analyze	 global	 administrative	
bodies	 in	 isolation	or,	at	most,	as	vertically	situated	above	national	bodies.	 	But,	as	discussed	
earlier,	the	very	same	regulatory	problem	can	be	handled	by	national	systems	like	the	United	
States	and	Belgium,	international	systems	like	the	WTO	and	the	UN	Environment	Programme,	
and	 in-between	 systems	 like	 the	 European	Union.	 The	 different	 jurisdictions	 interact	 and,	 in	
doing	so,	generate	the	global	regulatory	process.	Therefore,	to	understand	this	global	regulatory	
process,	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 focus	 on	 only	 one	 set	 of	 actors	 and	 law,	 even	 though,	 being	
















The	 third	 line	 of	 scholarship	 to	 have	 addressed	 elements	 of	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	 is	




others	 (Vogel,	1986;	Braithwaite	and	Braithwaite,	1995).	 	This	 research	 is	 legal	 realist	and,	as	
such,	 serves	as	an	essential	 complement	 to	 the	 largely	doctrinal	 research	 conducted	by	 legal	
scholars.	Nevertheless,	the	empirical	questions	and	theories	that	guide	socio-legal	research	are	
quite	narrow.	Since	the	central	concern	is	how	law	impacts	society,	comparative	studies	in	this	
tradition	generally	 investigate	specific	 types	of	regulatory	policy	with	direct	consequences	 for	
social	and	economic	outcomes—health	regulations,	environmental	regulations,	and	so	on—and	






























under	constitutional	and	administrative	 law,	are	 important.	Oversight	 is	 carried	out	by	public	








for	 the	profession	 can	be	developed	by	private	bar	 associations,	 overseen	by	 the	media	 and	
private	watchdog	organizations,	enforced	by	disgruntled	clients	in	a	dispute	resolution	process	
managed	by	 the	bar,	and	reviewed,	at	 least	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 in	 the	course	of	 the	dispute	
resolution	process.	Although	the	primary	focus	of	the	field	is	regulatory	institutions,	principles,	







that	 they	 serve	 those	 purposes.	 	 The	 terminology	 employed	 in	 this	 discussion	 reflects	 the	













novel—private	 regulation	 (at	 both	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 levels)	 and	 international	
jurisdictions.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	European	Union	defies	easy	classification	and,	for	
some	 purposes,	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 domestic	 jurisdiction	 and,	 for	 others,	 as	 an	 international	
jurisdiction.	 	 The	 EU’s	 variable	 status	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 uneven	 character	 of	 European	
integration:	 at	 the	 rulemaking	 stage,	 in	many	 policy	 areas,	 the	 EU	 exercises	 the	 power	 of	 a	













throughout	 the	 world.	 Rather,	 in	 some	 cases,	 before	 a	 specific	 set	 of	 rules	 can	 take	 effect,	
multiple	jurisdictions	can	be	called	into	action.	The	most	obvious	jurisdictional	configuration	is	
the	vertical	relationship	between	international	regimes	and	participating	states.	Domestic	rules	
are	 often	 subject	 to	 regulatory	 oversight	 and	 judicial	 review	 by	 international	 regimes.	 For	
instance,	 an	 EU	 rule	 on	 parabens	must	 be	 notified	 to	 a	WTO	 oversight	 committee4	 and	 can	
potentially	 trigger	 judicial	 review	 in	 the	WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Body	 (Shaffer,	 this	volume).	
Intervention	in	the	domestic	regulatory	process	can	even	be	horizontal,	from	another	domestic	
jurisdiction.	For	example,	a	privacy	rule	issued	by	the	U.S.	Federal	Trade	Commission	that	limits	





To	 better	 understand	 the	 scope	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 law	 covered	 by	 the	 field	 of	
comparative	 law	 and	 regulation,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 provide	 some	 historical	 context.	 Like	
constitutional	and	administrative	law	and	their	comparative	counterparts,	the	emergence	of	the	
field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	 regulation	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 concrete	 set	 of	 political	 and	 social	
developments.	Regulation,	like	written	constitutions	and	public	administration,	is	a	distinct	type	
of	 historical	 and	 social	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 not	 universal	 to	 all	 human	 societies.	 With	 the	
exception	of	the	United	States,	regulation	has	become	a	pervasive	form	of	state	governance	only	
in	 the	past	 thirty	 years	 (Levi-Faur,	2005;	 Scott,	 2006;	Dubash	and	Morgan,	2012).	 The	 rise	of	
















































important	 in	 liberal	democracies.	So	 too	 for	 laws	guaranteeing	citizens	access	 to	government	
documents	and	requiring	that	regulation	take	into	account	environmental	and	economic	impacts.	
The	criminal	and	civil	procedure	analyzed	in	this	volume	is	assessed	based	on	both	the	effective	
implementation	of	regulatory	policy	and	the	respect	 for	 liberal	rights.	 	The	section	on	 judicial	
review	analyzes	principles—proportionality,	 the	 right	 to	health,	and	participation	 rights—that	
are	meaningful	within	the	broader	context	of	liberal	democracy.			
In	sum,	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation	and	the	assessment	of	what	law	to	

























law	 of	 democracy	 is	 also	 excluded.	 Even	 though	 elections,	 political	 parties,	 and	 general	
parliamentary	 procedure	 undoubtedly	 influence	 regulation,	 they,	 together	 with	 their	 legal	
framework,	are	too	far	removed	from	the	process	of	enacting	specific	regulatory	norms	to	be	
considered	part	of	law	and	regulation.	Last,	as	was	explained	earlier,	there	are	subjects	such	as	





The	 field	of	 comparative	 law	and	 regulation	 is	motivated	by	 the	 larger	 intellectual	 project	of	
understanding	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process.	 How	 are	 social	 and	 economic	 problems	 like	
consumer	tracking	and	parabens	handled	in	the	contemporary,	global,	regulatory	process?		The	
objective	 is	not	to	generate	a	 laundry	 list	of	regulatory	 law	across	the	dozens	of	national	and	
international	 jurisdictions	 involved	 in	that	process.	Rather,	the	field	seeks	to	develop	theories	
and	analytical	tools	that	 illuminate	the	essential	properties	of	the	global	regulatory	process—
jurisdictional	diversity	and	commonality,	including	both	domestic	and	international	jurisdictions,	
convergence	 or	 divergence	 over	 time,	 and	 prescription	 based	 on	 comparison.	What	 are	 the	
distinctive	public	 institutions,	procedures,	 and	principles	 that	mark	different	 jurisdictions	and	
that	can	give	rise	to	variation	in	the	treatment	of	common	regulatory	problems	across	the	globe?	
What	are	the	political	and	social	processes	that	cause	convergence	in	some	jurisdictions,	with	









of	 commerce	 and	 has	 been	 dedicated,	 to	 a	 significant	 extent,	 to	 the	 project	 of	 facilitating	
commercial	 transactions	across	different	 jurisdictions	 (Dubinsky,	2005:	219–20;	Zimmermann,	
2008).	Many	of	the	theoretical	and	methodological	debates	of	the	discipline	have	been	driven	by	
the	 need	 for	 the	 law	 of	 contracts,	 essential	 to	 global	 transactions,	 to	 straddle	 multiple	
jurisdictions.	 Traditional	 comparative	 law,	 therefore,	 serves	 as	 a	 useful	 springboard	 for	
understanding	globalization,	this	time	not	in	the	private	law	sphere	but	in	the	different	context	
of	 public	 law,	 that	 is,	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process.	 Comparative	 law	 has	 developed	 three	
promising	 lines	 of	 theoretical	 inquiry	 for	 understanding	 the	 defining	 features	 of	 the	 global	
regulatory	process:	descriptive	classifications,	causal	transplant	theory,	and	normative	theory	on	
how	to	compare	in	the	service	of	law	reform	and	law	unification,	including	the	functional	method.	
Classification	 schemes	 serve	 to	 capture	 the	 important	 legal	 attributes	 that	 characterize	
jurisdictions	and	to	understand	differences	and	similarities	among	jurisdictions.	Theories	of	legal	
transplants	are	designed	to	explain	whether	or	not	law	spreads	and	jurisdictions	converge.	And	








to-day	 operation	 of	 the	 law	 in	 any	 particular	 system	 and	 identify	 the	 crucial	 elements	 that	
generate	the	law	across	multiple	jurisdictions.	The	categories	that	constitute	a	classification	are	
designed	 to	 capture	 complex	 patterns	 of	 behavior	 in	 the	 law	 and	 to	 convey	 the	 multiple,	




















jurisdiction	have	changed,	and	that	 it	 is	necessary	 to	switch	 the	classification	and	redraw	the	






















public	 prosecutors:	 the	 adversarial	 versus	 inquisitorial	models	 of	 criminal	 procedure	 (Langer,	
2014);	and	the	hierarchical	versus	coordinate	forms	of	authority	for	civil	and	criminal	procedure	
(Damaška,	 1986).	 In	 constitutional	 law,	 there	 are	 classifications	 built	 on	 categories	 such	 as	
systems	 of	 judicial	 review	 (Ferreres	 Comella,	 2011;	 Stone	 Sweet,	 2012),	 the	 structure	 of	
government	 (Halberstam,	 2012),	 and	 constitutional	 amendment	 rules	 (Albert,	 2014).	 In	














subfields	of	 law.	To	the	extent	 that	 this	 is	possible,	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	general	discipline	has	
ignored	important	social,	political,	and	intellectual	forces	that,	like	the	activity	of	regulating,	fail	





law,	 the	social	and	 legal	processes	of	globalization	have	advanced	to	the	point	where	 it	 is	no	





international	 spheres	 and	 that	 traditional	 comparative	 law	 should	 seek	 to	 incorporate	
international	jurisdictions	too.		

















Rule	 by	 law	 refers	 to	 the	 classic	 theory	 that	 all	 state	 action	must	 be	 authorized	 by	 a	
written	law	and	must	adhere	to	the	parameters	of	that	law	(Allison,	2007:	157–85;	Krygier,	2012,	
2015).7	This	paradigm	emphasizes	 that	 legal	 certainty,	 rules,	and	 independent	policing	of	 the	
rules	by	courts	are	central	to	the	legitimacy	of	public	action.		The	origins	and	substance	of	the	
law	are	somewhat	secondary	to	the	fact	that	the	state	and	the	bureaucracy	are	made	subject	to	
the	 law.	Historically,	 rule	by	 law	 is	associated	with	 the	 rise	of	 liberalism,	 the	emergence	of	a	
																																								 																				




















review	 remains	 focused	 on	 whether	 state	 action	 is	 authorized	 by	 the	 law	 and	 falls,	 roughly	
speaking,	 within	 the	 parameters	 contemplated	 by	 the	 law	 (Huang	 and	 Law,	 this	 volume;	
Ohnesorge,	this	volume).		
The	 rule-by-law	 paradigm	 also	 has	 traction	 for	 understanding	 developments	 in	
authoritarian	systems	like	China	and	Egypt	(Ginsburg	and	Moustafa,	2008).	While	in	the	classic	
formulation,	rule	by	law	is	designed	to	protect	an	autonomous	private	sphere	from	incursions	by	




modern	 economic	 policymaking	or	 because	of	 entrenched	 cronyism	and	 corruption.	 In	 these	
political	science	theories,	judicial	review	of	administrative	action	based	on	the	authorizing	law	
can	 serve	 as	 a	 substitute	 for	 hierarchical	 control	 (Moustafa,	 2007;	 Ginsburg,	 2008).	 In	 such	






In	 jurisdictions	 spurred	 by	 the	 rule-by-law	 paradigm,	 other	 types	 of	 judicial	 review	of	
regulation	such	as	proportionality	are	either	absent	or	relatively	inactive.	Regulatory	oversight	
mechanisms	that	are	designed	to	guarantee	public	accountability	and	fundamental	rights,	such	









the	role	of	 law	in	the	regulatory	process	goes	beyond	enforcing	rule	by	law.	 	 It	 is	designed	to	
ensure	that	the	state	actors	involved	in	the	regulatory	process―the	legislature	and	the	political	
executive	 as	 well	 as	 state	 administration	 and	 the	 various	 bodies	 responsible	 for	
implementation―respect	a	variety	of	liberal	rights	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	certain	positive	social	
and	economic	rights	(Bignami,	this	volume).		The	fundamental	rights	paradigm	is	the	historical	







since	 the	1980s:	 independent	ombudsmen	and	government	 commissions	with	 the	mission	of	
safeguarding	specific	 fundamental	rights	 in	the	activities	of	the	state,	 including	regulation	(de	
Beco,	2009;	European	Union	Agency	for	Fundamental	Rights,	2010;	Bignami,	2011a).	Consistent	




on	 safeguarding	 rights	 than	 in	 rule-by-law	 jurisdictions.	 In	 legal	 systems	 such	 as	 the	 United	
Kingdom	and	 Scandinavian	 countries,	which	historically	 have	experienced	greater	democratic	
stability,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 fundamental	 rights,	 especially	 as	 enforced	by	 formalist	 courts,	 has	












executive,	 and	 the	 bureaucracy	 is	 required	 to	 follow	 procedures	 that	 promote	 popular	
participation	 in	 policymaking.	 This	model	 is	 associated	with	 a	weak	 central	 bureaucracy	 and	
executive	branch,	strong	courts,	and	a	stable	and	long	tradition	of	elections	and	legislatures.	The	
United	 States,	 which	 is	 the	 prime	 example	 of	 ballot-box	 democracy,	 is	 characterized	 by	 an	
outsized	 influence	 of	 the	 courts	 and	 the	 adversarial,	 common	 law	 model	 of	 government	
administration.	 	 The	 courts	 are	 tasked	 with	 functions	 that	 are	 handled,	 elsewhere,	 by	
administrative	 authorities;	 when	 powers	 are	 delegated	 to	 administrative	 agencies,	 their	
procedure	is	adversarial	and	judicial	review	is	all	but	certain	(Kagan,	2001;	Morag-Levine,	2003;	
Schiller,	 this	 volume).	 The	 proceduralism	 of	 the	 common	 law	 state	was,	 after	 the	 demise	 of	
substantive	due	process	and	economic	and	social	rights	in	the	New	Deal,	coupled	with	a	vision	of	
public	law	as	a	handmaiden	of	the	electoral	process	and	democracy	(Bickel,	1962;	Ely,	1980).	In	












administrative	 rulemaking,	what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 “hard-look	 review”	 or,	more	 broadly	
speaking,	“proceduralized	rationality	review”	(Mashaw,	2012:	289).	The	corollary	of	democratic	
proceduralism	 is	 relatively	 little	 judicial	 review	 designed	 to	 safeguard	 substantive	 values	
independent	 of	 the	 statutory	 framework.	 The	 importance	 of	 ballot-box	 democracy	 has	 also	
undermined	 the	 emergence	 of	 oversight	 mechanisms	 outside	 of	 the	 tripartite	 scheme	 of	
government,	 that	 is,	 independent	 ombudsmen	 and	 government	 commissions	 tasked	 with	
enforcing	rights	(Grunewald,	1988:	53–55;	Bignami,	2007:	696–97).	In	the	domain	of	regulatory	
enforcement,	the	prominence	of	private	class	actions	as	compared	with	criminal	prosecutions	
and	 administrative	 enforcement	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 ballot-box	model:	 the	 class	 action	 is	 a	
historical	import	from	the	English	common	law	which	has	been	far	more	successful	in	America	
than	 in	 England	 due	 to	 a	 weak	 state,	 strong	 courts,	 and	 democratic	 populism	 (Hensler,	 this	
volume).		





and	 Iacoviello,	2010;	Francheschet	and	Díez,	2012).	 	Examples	 include	 India	and	a	number	of	
countries	in	Latin	America.		






courts,	 or	 newly	 invigorated,	 as	where	 access	 to	 justice	 has	 been	 dramatically	 expanded	 for	




democracies	 tend	 to	 list	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 set	 of	 individual	 rights	 than	 in	 established	
democracies,	courts	are	motivated	as	much	by	the	constitutional	text	as	by	the	need	to	act	in	the	
face	 of	 weak	 bureaucracies	 and	 low	 state	 capacity	 (Lamprea,	 Forman,	 and	 Chapman,	 this	
volume).	Common	oversight	mechanisms,	such	as	transparency,	which	in	other	democracies	are	
conceived	 largely	as	a	 supplement	 to	 the	ordinary	political	process,	 are	used	 for	purposes	of	
subverting	 and	 transforming	 both	 the	 bureaucracy	 and	 the	 traditional	 system	 of	 political	
competition	 (Worthy,	 this	 volume).	 These	 jurisdictions	 are	 relatively	 open	 to	 establishing	
alternative	forms	of	regulatory	enforcement	that	rely	on	private	initiative	(Gidi,	2003;	2012:	901–






and	 that	 can	 illuminate	 jurisdictional	 diversity	 and	 similarity	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	
concerns	the	legal	relationship	between	public	and	private	actors	(Bignami,	2011b:	884–90).	The	




















regulation	 and	 private	 self-regulation:	 representatives	 of	 interest	 groups	 sit	 on	 government	
bodies	 and	 private	 associations	 take	 part	 in	 state-recognized	 self-regulatory	 schemes.	 This	
organization	 of	 public–private	 relations	 is	 created	 and	 sustained	 by	 the	 general	 principles	 of	





law	 allows	 the	 line	 between	 the	 public	 and	 private	 spheres	 to	 be	 routinely	 blurred.	 In	
constitutional	law,	this	mixing	of	public	and	private	action	has	been	tested	largely	in	the	area	of	





policymaking	 but	 also	 on	 how	 they	 are	 organized	 in	 society:	 in	 pluralism,	 there	 are	 numerous,	 relatively	 small	
organizations	while	in	neo-corporatism	there	are	a	few,	broadly	representative	interest	associations.	
9	Political	science	theories	typically	focus	on	the	high-level	politics	of	social	and	economic	policymaking	(Schmitter,	
1974;	Lijphart,	1999).	 In	particular,	neo-corporatism	 is	associated	with	 the	sweeping	 tripartite	bargains	between	
government	and	the	peak	associations	of	labor	and	industry	that	were	popular	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	and	that	were	
designed	to	govern	a	host	of	policies	related	to	the	workplace,	macroeconomic	indicators,	and	the	welfare	state.		
Neo-corporatist	 forms	 of	 interest	 representation,	 however,	 have	 never	 been	 limited	 to	 just	 labor	 and	 business	
groups	or	to	grand	macroeconomic	bargains.	They	extend	to	government	regulation	in	areas	such	as	healthcare,	the	










Pluralism	 and	 neo-corporatism	 have	 been	 linked	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 theories	 of	 political	
philosophy.	American	pluralism	is	rooted	in	the	notion	that	competition	among	economic	and	
social	 interests,	 free	 of	 state	 intervention,	 results	 in	 stable	 and	 fair	 outcomes,	 and	 that	 the	
primary	 function	 of	 the	 political	 process	 is	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 neutral	 arena	 for	 interest	 group	
competition	(Truman,	1951;	Dahl,	1971;	Tichenor	and	Harris,	2005).	To	single	out	a	particular	
group	 or	 set	 of	 groups,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 public	 regulatory	 scheme,	 would	 be	 to	 unfairly	 and	
unproductively	interfere	with	that	competition.	Neo-corporatism,	by	contrast,	rests	on	political	





captured	 with	 the	 contrasting	 metaphors	 of	 interest	 group	 competition	 and	 interconnected	
social	solidarities.		
Although	 the	 difference	 between	 pluralism	 and	 neo-corporatism	 may	 seem	 quite	
abstract,	 it	 is	 both	 cause	 and	 effect	 of	 a	 number	 of	 concrete	 aspects	 of	 regulatory	 law.	 In	
American	 pluralism,	when	 administrative	 agencies	 engage	 in	 rulemaking,	 the	 law	 guarantees	
private	 parties	 formal	 equality	 before	 the	 bureaucracy:	 all	 private	 parties	 have	 a	 right	 to	
participate	 in	 the	 administrative	 process,	 through	 notice-and-comment	 rulemaking,	 and	 to	
enforce	those	rights	in	the	courts	(Wagner,	this	volume).	Private,	industry	bodies	also	routinely	
undertake	rulemaking	functions,	but	most	often	in	the	shadow	of	the	law,	in	the	numerous	gaps	













Büthe,	 2003:	 23–25;	 Strauss,	 this	 volume).	 	 A	 final	 element	 of	 pluralist	 law	 is	 regulatory	
enforcement.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	United	States	is	remarkable	in	the	extent	to	which	private	










(Smismans,	 this	 volume).10	 The	 law	 can	 also	 empower	 specific	 private	 bodies	 to	 enact	 self-
regulatory	rules,	while	contemporaneously	requiring	that	such	private	bodies	give	other	social	
actors	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	their	work,	hence	achieving,	at	least	in	theory,	the	same	















two	 monopolist	 private	 bodies—the	 International	 Organization	 for	 Standardization	 and	 the	
International	Electrotechnical	Commission—and	the	 two	organizations	are	 legally	designed	to	







designed	 to	 guarantee	 that	 private	 associations	 are	 representative	 of	 consumers,	 workers,	
environmental	interests,	or	other	classes	of	regulatory	beneficiaries	(Hensler,	this	volume).11			
So	far,	the	discussion	has	been	limited	to	Europe	and	the	United	States.	The	analysis	of	




allowed	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 policymaking,	 but	 in	 which,	 unlike	 neo-corporatism,	 the	



















systems,	 the	 organization	 of	 private	 groups	 within	 society	 has	 pluralized	 immensely	 with	
democratization	and	the	emergence	of	a	vibrant	civil	society	sector	(Avritzer,	2002;	Risley,	2015).	
On	the	other	hand,	the	question	of	how	the	law	governs	private	access	to	public	rulemaking	and	



















Lest	 these	 classifications	 appear	 too	 abstract	 to	 afford	 analytical	 traction	 on	 the	
commonalities	 and	 diversities	 that	 mark	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process,	 let	 us	 return	 to	 the	
examples	of	 consumer	 tracking	and	parabens.	The	paradigms	of	public	 law	are	 likely	 to	have	





world.	 Internet	 companies	 and	 privacy	 advocates	 can	 expect	 judicial	 review	 of	 any	 future	
consumer-tracking	rules	to	operate	quite	differently	depending	on	the	jurisdiction	in	which	they	















The	 implications	 of	 the	models	 of	 public–private	 relations	 can	 be	 illustrated	with	 the	
parabens	example.	In	the	global	debate	over	parabens	safety,	the	divide	between	pluralism	and	
neo-corporatism	 points	 to	 the	 key	 venues	 where	 the	 regulatory	 battle	 is	 being	 fought:	
administrative	 rulemaking	 procedure	 in	 the	 United	 States	 versus	 expert	 committees	 with	
stakeholder	 representation	 in	 the	 European	 Union.	 Bureaucrats	 in	 the	 United	 States	 are	
gathering	scientific	and	economic	data	on	parabens	from	a	variety	of	industry	groups,	research	
institutions,	and	consumer	activists	with	an	eye	to	surviving	a	contentious	rulemaking	procedure.	
European	civil	 servants,	by	contrast,	are	drawing	on	 input	 from	their	committees	of	scientific	
experts,	 industry	 representatives,	 and	 civil	 society	 groups,	 as	 well	 as	 less	 formal	 types	 of	
stakeholder	consultation,	to	determine	the	dangers	of	parabens	and	the	appropriate	regulatory	
response.	It	is	possible	that	these	differences	will	affect	not	only	the	regulatory	process	but	also	














Research	 in	 the	 law	 and	 social	 sciences	 shares	 the	 common	 premise	 that	 legal	 systems	 are	
interdependent	and	that	when	convergence	is	observed	it	can	be	explained,	at	least	in	part,	by	
the	 decision	 of	 legal	 and	 political	 actors	 in	 one	 jurisdiction	 to	 follow	 prior	 developments	 in	
another	 jurisdiction	 (Graziadei,	 2008;	 Simmons,	 Dobbin,	 and	 Garrett,	 2008).	 In	 line	with	 this	
premise,	 scholarship	 in	 both	 traditions	 generally	 employs	 a	 sequential	 conceptual	 scheme	of	
transfer	and	 reception	 (Short,	 this	volume).	At	 the	 front	end,	under	 the	 influence	of	external	
forces,	 domestic	 elites	 make	 formal	 legal	 commitments	 by	 entering	 into	 international	



















conflicts	 and	 scrutiny	 of	 ordinary	 politics.	 That	 foreign	 authority,	 in	 turn,	 is	 linked	 to	
characteristics	 such	 as	 historical	 vintage	 and	 completeness,	 for	 example	 Roman	 law,	 or	





and	 law,	 the	 transplant	 phenomenon	 is	 a	 desirable	 one	 (Nelken,	 2003;	 Twining,	 2005).	 In	
traditional	 comparative	 scholarship,	 the	most	 foundational	 law	of	 receiving	 jurisdictions,	 and	
therefore	 the	most	 vulnerable	 to	 the	disruptive	potential	 of	 transplants,	 is	 the	 structure	 and	
content	 of	 private	 law:	 whether	 a	 system	 is	 common	 law	 or	 civil	 law,	 and	 within	 civil	 law	
























possible	 causal	mechanisms:	 coercion	exerted	by	powerful	 actors	 such	as	wealthy	 states	and	
international	organizations;	competition	among	states	for	foreign	investment	and	global	market	

























both	 sets	 of	 literature	 have	 largely	 overlooked	 the	 core	of	 regulatory	 law—not	 the	 technical	
substance	of	parabens	and	consumer-tracking	regulation	but	 the	 fundamental	procedure	and	






and	 emulation.	 In	 both	 research	 traditions,	 the	 role	 of	 power	 is	 fairly	 limited.	 In	 the	 legal	
literature,	 power	 is	 largely	 discarded	 as	 a	motive	 for	 contemporary	 transplants	 because	 it	 is	
associated	with	the	military	force	of	nineteenth-	and	twentieth-century	colonization	(Graziadei,	
2008).	In	the	social	sciences	literature,	the	concept	of	power	is	central	to	the	diffusion	mechanism	
of	 coercion,	 which	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 express	 use	 of	 economic	 leverage	 by	 international	
organizations	 and	 wealthy	 countries	 to	 achieve	 policy	 change	 in	 dependent	 countries.	 The	
empirical	work	on	the	causes	of	diffusion,	however,	has	produced	scant	evidence	of	coercion	
(Garrett,	 Dobbin,	 and	 Simmons,	 2008:	 346)	 and	 has	 come	 to	 emphasize	 the	 other	 three	
mechanisms	(Gilardi,	2010;	Maggetti	and	Gilardi,	2015).			




of	 legal	 transplant	 theory,	 sitting	 in	 their	 domestic	 chambers	 and	 deliberately	 and	
opportunistically	 borrowing	 from	 foreign	 legal	 systems.	 They	 are	 also	 bureaucrats	 and	
government	 officials	 engaged	 in	 ongoing	 negotiations	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 international	 regulatory	









international	 political	 processes	 produce	 a	 constant	 stream	 of	 harmonized	 legal	 rules,	 yet	
national	 participation	 requires	 significant	 resources,	 and	 therefore	 it	 is	 highly	 plausible	 that	
power	 differentials	 among	 states	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	 rules	 which	 are	 then	 transferred	 to	




must	 be	 able	 to	 draw	 on	 an	 elaborate	 doctrinal	 apparatus,	 which	 in	 turn	 requires	 a	 well-
developed	legal	establishment,	which	in	turn	requires	significant	national	wealth	and	power.	As	











private	 relations	 dominates	 in	 the	 receiving	 jurisdiction	 may	 operate	 as	 a	 source	 of	 fit	 and	
contribute	 to	 the	empirical	 investigation	of	diffusion.	 To	 illustrate,	 the	United	States	 and	 the	
European	 Union	 may	 forge	 agreement	 on	 regulatory	 policies	 such	 as	 consumer	 privacy	 or	
chemicals	safety.	But	as	long	as	the	two	jurisdictions	subscribe	to	dissimilar	paradigms	of	public	
law	 and	 public–private	 relations,	 those	 policies	 will	 likely	 operate	 very	 differently	 in	 their	
respective	 jurisdictions.	More	 specific	 issues	 such	as	 consumer	 tracking	 and	parabens	will	 be	








literature.	 	As	already	mentioned,	 transplant	theory	 focuses	 largely	on	private	 law,	the	divide	
between	the	common	law	and	the	civil	law,	and	the	potential	problems	generated	by	introducing	
foreign	elements,	drawn	from	across	the	civil	law–common	law	divide,	into	what	are	believed	to	
be	 conceptually	 intricate,	 and	 culturally	 important,	 systems	 of	 legal	 authority.	 Research	 in	
comparative	law	and	regulation	shifts	attention	to	the	public	law	sphere	and	provides	evidence	
of	other	culturally	and	theoretically	significant	differences	in	systems	of	law	and	legal	authority.	
The	 countries	 that	 fall	 into	 one	 or	 the	 other	 category,	 as	 those	 which	 belong	 to	 either	 the	
common	law	or	civil	law	tradition,	do	not	necessarily	represent	radically	different	political	and	
social	worlds.		Their	law,	however,	is	based	on	different	historical	and	cultural	premises	as	to	how	









law	 is	 not	 simply	 a	morass	of	 technical	 rules	but	 rather	 is	 part	 of	 a	 rich	 tradition	of	 law	and	
democracy,	 and	 therefore	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 use	 the	 analytical	 framework	 of	 transplants	 in	
comparative	law	to	evaluate	political	efforts	at	transformation.14			
Last,	the	field	of	comparative	law	and	regulation	points	to	an	important	site	for	transfer	
and	 reception	 that	 has	 been	 overlooked	 in	 the	 existing	 literature:	 international	 jurisdictions	










procedures,	 principles,	 and	 institutions	 are	 also	 transplanted	 and,	 unlike	 the	 substance	 of	
regulatory	policy	which	generally	bites	only	at	the	national	level,	this	type	of	law	can	govern	the	
regulatory	 function	 in	 both	 national	 and	 international	 jurisdictions.	 Since	 domestic	 and	
international	 jurisdictions	 interact	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process,	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	
regulatory	 law	migrates	 between	 both	 types	 of	 jurisdictions.	 To	 illustrate	 with	 international	
examples	from	this	volume,	 it	might	be	that	the	law	that	governs	rulemaking	by	international	
financial	networks	 (Zaring),	oversight	by	WTO	committees	 (Shaffer),	enforcement	 through	EU	
composite	procedures	(Hofmann),	and	dispute	resolution	by	international	investment	tribunals	
(Yackee)	 is	 borrowed	 from	 domestic	 jurisdictions.15	 In	 other	 words,	 transplants	 should	 be	
conceptualized	 as	 a	 single	 process	 that	 can	 operate	 in	multiple	 directions:	 	 law	 can	migrate	
sideways,	 from	one	country	or	group	of	countries	 to	another,	downwards,	 from	 international	
systems	to	the	national	level,	and	upwards,	from	national	governments	to	the	basic	operating	
rules	 of	 international	 jurisdictions.	 By	 influencing	 the	 legal	 procedures	 and	 principles	 of	
international	systems,	government	officials,	firms,	and	other	types	of	actors	can	expect	to	shape	
regulatory	output	over	the	long	run	(cf.	Farber	and	O’Connell,	2010)	and	therefore	the	incentive	




When	regulatory	operators	navigate	the	myriad	 jurisdictions	 involved	 in	the	global	 regulatory	




























law	 and,	 even	 more	 important,	 could	 create	 the	 harmonized,	 international	 law	 that	 would	



















jurisdictions;	 and	 assess	 the	 degree	 of	 similarity	 or	 difference	 that	 marks	 the	 various	 legal	
solutions	 (Zweigert,	 1951;	 David,	 1955;	 Schlesinger,	 1968;	 Zweigert	 and	 Kötz,	 1998).	 If	 the	
comparative	 analysis	 revealed	 a	 common	 solution,	 then,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 law	







social	 sciences.	 This	 approach	 to	 comparative	 research	 has	 been	 very	 powerful	 in	 the	 legal	
academy.	 It	 has	 profoundly	 influenced	 the	 contribution	 that	 has	 been	 made	 by	 scholars	 of	
comparative	law	to	political	projects	of	domestic	law	reform	and	international	law	unification.	
With	 the	 globalization	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process,	 the	 functional	 method	 of	 private	
comparative	 law	 can	 be	 used	 equally	 productively	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 public	 law.	 	 The	 use	 of	
comparison,	 as	 a	 rhetorical	 device	 in	 support	 of	 legal	 prescription,	 has	 become	 increasingly	
























there	 are	 significant	 differences	 in	 legal	 solutions	 among	 jurisdictions.	 It	 does	 not,	 however,	
provide	sufficient	intellectual	tools	for	analyzing	the	different	solutions	and	coming	to	principled	
conclusions	as	to	which	one	makes	for	the	“better”	law	(Hill,	1989;	Michaels,	2008).	Two	criteria	
that	 are	 often	mentioned	 are	 doctrinal	 completeness	 and	 legal	 certainty	 (Zweigert	 and	Kötz,	
1998),	but	that	hardly	exhausts	the	list	of	attributes	that	make	law	desirable.	In	addition,	until	
recently,	 the	 discipline	 of	 comparative	 law	 has	 made	 relatively	 little	 effort	 to	 use	 empirical	





















contract	 law	 is	 to	 facilitate	 private	 transactions,	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 to	 use,	 without	 much	
justification,	normative	criteria	such	as	clarity	and	simplicity	to	evaluate	that	law.	In	the	domain	
of	 law	 and	 regulation,	 by	 contrast,	 the	 different	 theories	 of	 public	 law	 and	 public–private	
relations	 caution	 against	 assuming	 agreement	 on	 the	 normative	 criteria	 for	 assessing	 law.		
Instead,	it	is	necessary	to	explicitly	identify	and	justify	why	some	institutions,	procedures,	and	
principles	are	better	than	others.		
To	be	 complete,	 comparative	 analysis	 should	 also	 employ	 empirical	methods	 (Hirschl,	
2014).	Once	the	normative	attributes	of	better	law	are	singled	out,	it	is	important	to	assess	those	
qualities	based	not	only	on	the	stated	purposes	of	the	law	but	also	on	its	empirical	operation.	It	





project	 or	 policy	 initiative.	 Some	 of	 that	 scholarly	 effort	 can	 fruitfully	 be	 dedicated	 to	 the	
empirical	investigation	of	the	impact	of	law	on	regulatory	politics	and	policies.		
Since	 discussions	 of	 research	 approaches	 and	 methodologies	 can	 be	 quite	 slippery	
without	 concrete	examples,	 it	 is	worthwhile	 illustrating	with	examples	 from	this	volume.	The	










public	rulemaking	process,	 it	 represents	the	pluralist	category	of	public–private	relations.	 It	 is	
often	claimed	to	be	the	better	law,	as	compared	with	neo-corporatist	and	other	forms	of	private	
participation,	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 extensive,	 and	 formally	 equal,	 participation	 that	 is	





Deborah	 Hensler,	 in	 her	 analysis	 of	 private	 class	 actions,	 systematically	 reviews	 the	
normative	reasons	why	class	actions	might	be	the	better	 law―efficient	management	of	mass	
claims,	 ensuring	 that	 small-value	 claims	 will	 be	 compensated	 (“collective	 redress”),	 and	










To	 conclude	 this	 discussion	 of	 how	 prescription	 based	 on	 comparative	 law	 should	 be	
conducted,	it	bears	highlighting	that,	as	with	the	theorization	geared	at	mapping	legal	variation	



















become	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	 make	 the	 intellectual	 case	 for	 separating	 international	 from	





















presentation	of	 the	 law	and	the	organization	of	 the	chapters	move	 from	the	most	 traditional	




understanding	 the	 global	 regulatory	 process	 and	 central	 to	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law	 and	
regulation.	To	repeat:	paradigms	of	public	law	and	models	of	public–private	relations	to	capture	











intervene	 in	markets,	 it	 is	 often	 taken	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 first	 examples	 of	 the	 contemporary	
regulatory	state	(Levi-Faur,	2005;	Yeung,	2010).		Indeed,	in	American	legal	scholarship,	the	terms	
“regulation”	and	“administrative	agency”	are	often	used	interchangeably	with	”administration”	
and	 “bureaucracy,”	not	 as	 specific	 and	more	 recently	established	 sub-types	of	 administrative	




























prior	 to	 the	 late	 1980s,	 countries	 in	 East	 Asia	were	 conceptualized	 as	 developmental	 states.	
Although	there	was	little	state	ownership	and	most	industry	was	in	private	hands,	governments	
intervened	heavily	to	direct	investment	and	production	in	strategically	selected	market	sectors	
and	 to	manage	 trade	 and	 capital	 relations	with	 the	 global	market.	 This	 industrial	 policy	was	






changes	 of	 the	 late	 1980s	 worked	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	 institutional	 dimension	 of	 the	
administrative	 state:	 with	 democratization	 (in	 Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea)	 and	 greater	 party	








shaped	 by	 law:	 the	 legal	 procedure	 that	 governs	 public	 participation	 when	 administrative	























legitimacy	 crisis	 of	 the	 1990s,	 advisory	 committees	 have	 been	 joined	 by	 additional	 legal	
procedures.	 Some	of	 these	procedures	have	been	 inspired	by	 the	neo-corporatist	 impulse	 to	
privilege	more	representative	groups	in	the	policymaking	process	and	others	have	been	designed	
to	 facilitate	 full	 and	 free	 competition	 among	 all	 societal	 actors,	 more	 in	 the	 pluralist	 mold.	
Smismans	 concludes	 that	 the	 current	 rulemaking	 system	 should	 be	 conceptualized	 as	
“pluralisation	without	proceduralisation”―expanded	opportunities	for	participation	by	a	wide	
array	of	actors	without	legalistic	enforcement	of	procedural	rights	in	court,	as	is	characteristic	of	










Chapter	 6,	 there	 are	 two	 common	 forms	of	 impact	 assessment	 today:	 environmental	 impact	
assessment,	which	is	triggered	by	public	projects	and	other	types	of	government	initiatives	that	


















successive	 waves	 of	 diffusion	 across	 the	 globe	 and	 therefore	 represents	 an	 ideal	 area	 to	
investigate	theories	of	transplants	and	diffusion.	Worthy’s	chapter	reveals	how	reception	in	the	








smooth.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 India	 the	 social	 justice	 and	 anti-corruption	 campaigners	who	 are	 the	
heaviest	users	of	the	law	routinely	clash	with	a	feudal	bureaucracy	over	compliance.	The	conflict	


















assert	 control	 over	 the	 bureaucracy.	 They	 involve	 a	 radical,	 brief	 change	 in	 China’s	 standard	
enforcement	style—lax	and	captured	by	industry—in	which	regulators	resort	to	more	formal	and	
punitive	tactics.	In	van	Rooij’s	account,	the	campaign	enforcement	style	is	a	product	of	the	rule-
by-law	 paradigm	 advanced	 earlier	 in	 this	 introduction:	 in	 the	 Chinese	 authoritarian	 system,	




the	 public	 and	 to	maintain	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party.	 	 Van	 Rooij	 concludes	 by	
observing	 the	 use	 of	 similar	 enforcement	 campaigns	 to	 respond	 to	 policy	 failures	 and	 public	





























In	 Chapter	 10,	 I	 	 analyze	 the	 classifications	 used	 in	 the	 scholarly	 literature	 to	 capture	
variation	 in	 judicial	 review	 of	 government	 policymaking	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States.	
Although	these	taxonomies	apply	to	 judicial	review	of	the	administrative	state	 in	general,	 the	



















and	 continues	 to	 figure	prominently,	 in	 the	 law	of	 Japan,	Korea,	 and	Taiwan―judicial	 review	
focused	on	the	formal	legality	of	whether	administrative	action	respects	the	boundaries	set	down	
by	law.		The	contribution	then	analyzes	the	variable	reception	of	the	doctrine	of	proportionality,	
drawn	 from	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 model	 and	 used	 by	 East	 Asian	 courts	 to	 scrutinize	 the	
substance	of	administrative	determinations.	Huang	and	Law	observe	that	proportionality	has	had	
considerably	more	traction	in	Korea	and	Taiwan	than	in	Japan	and	China.	Part	of	the	explanation	
for	 this	 variation,	 they	 suggest,	 is	 the	presence	of	 relatively	new	and	powerful	 constitutional	
courts	 in	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan.	 These	 new	 constitutional	 courts	 have	 sought	 to	 establish	 their	





In	 Chapter	 12,	 Everaldo	 Lamprea,	 Lisa	 Forman,	 and	 Audrey	 R.	 Chapman	 analyze	 the	
operation	 of	 the	 transformative	 democracy	 paradigm	 in	 Colombia,	 specifically	 constitutional	
review	of	 healthcare	 regulation.	 Like	many	 other	 relatively	 new	democracies,	 the	 Colombian	
Constitution	 of	 1991	 contains	 a	 comprehensive	 set	 of	 positive	 social	 and	 economic	 rights,	
including	the	right	to	health,	and	establishes	an	expansive	system	of	constitutional	adjudication,	
in	which	 it	 is	 easy	 for	 individuals	 to	 bring	 constitutional	 complaints	 (tutela).	 	 As	 the	 chapter	












civil	 society	 actors	 were	 called	 upon	 to	 participate;	 and	 the	 process	 resulted	 in	 concrete	
improvements	 to	 the	 healthcare	 system	 that	 very	 likely	 would	 not	 have	 been	 made	 in	 the	
absence	of	constitutional	law	and	judicial	review.	
This	 section	 concludes	with	 Chapter	 13	 by	 Susan	 Rose-Ackerman,	 Stefanie	 Egidy,	 and	
James	Fowkes.		They	analyze	judicial	review	in	the	United	States,	Germany,	South	Africa,	and	the	
European	Union,	 both	 judicial	 review	 of	 the	 rules	 adopted	 by	 administrative	 authorities	 and	
those	adopted	by	legislative	assemblies.	The	chapter	argues	in	favor	of	judicial	review	designed	
to	promote	democratic	participation	in	generating	the	rules,	reflecting	to	some	extent	U.S.	law	





















of	 conduct—which	 empower	 three	 categories	 of	 business	 actors—industry	 associations,	
individual	 firms,	 and	 multinational	 corporations.	 The	 contributions	 also	 highlight	 different	
aspects	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process	 that	 can	 be	 handled	 by	 private	 bodies:	 rulemaking	 in	 the	
chapters	on	standard	setting	and	performance-based	regulation	and	enforcement	in	the	chapter	
on	private	codes	of	conduct.		
	In	 Chapter	 14,	 Peter	 Strauss	 chronicles	 the	 extensive	 reliance,	 in	 both	 U.S.	 and	 EU	
regulation,	on	the	private	technical	standards	set	by	industry	associations.		Strauss	reviews	some	
of	the	differences,	along	the	lines	of	the	neo-corporatist	and	pluralist	models,	that	separate	how	






requirements”	 of	 standards	 be	 stated	 on	 the	 face	 of	 the	 regulation	 and	 industry	 technical	
standards	are	considered	soft,	not	binding,	law,	meaning	that	compliance	with	such	standards	is	
but	one	way	of	demonstrating	compliance	with	the	“essential	requirements.”	To	restate	in	the	
























In	 a	 recent,	 large-N	 study,	 Short	 and	 her	 co-authors	 demonstrate	 that	 compliance	 with	
transnational	labor	standards―to	refer	back	to	the	earlier	discussion,	the	domestic	reception	of	
transplanted	 law―varies	systematically	across	national	 jurisdictions.	 In	particular,	 four	factors	
contribute	 to	 compliance:	 ratification	of	 ILO	 conventions	 by	 the	 state	 in	which	 the	 factory	 is	
located;	highly	protective	domestic	 labor	regulation;	high	 levels	of	press	freedom;	and,	 in	the	
buyer	 markets	 served	 by	 the	 multinational	 corporation,	 a	 wealthy	 and	 socially	 conscious	














The	 last	 section	of	 the	volume	 is	dedicated	 to	 international	 regulatory	 systems.	 International	
jurisdictions	have	come	to	function	increasingly	as	independent	sites	of	regulatory	power	that	
interface	 with	 domestic	 jurisdictions	 and	 other	 international	 bodies	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	
process.	 Depending	 on	 the	 system,	 international	 bodies	 can	 intervene	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	
regulatory	 process—rulemaking,	 oversight,	 enforcement,	 and	 judicial	 review.	 International	
jurisdictions	 vary	 considerably,	 both	 in	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 powers	 and	 their	 degree	 of	 legal	
formality,	and	this	section	is	designed	to	include	a	representative	subset.		
In	Chapter	17,	Gregory	Shaffer	develops	a	novel	analytical	framework	for	understanding	
the	 interplay	between	domestic	 jurisdictions	and	the	World	Trade	Organization.	 	The	chapter	
proposes	a	four-part	scheme,	supported	by	numerous	examples,	for	understanding	and	assessing	
the	impact	of	the	WTO	on	national	regulatory	governance:	(1)	changes	in	the	boundary	between	





theories	 of	 diffusion,	 the	 WTO	 illustrates	 a	 number	 of	 different	 mechanisms	 by	 which	
international	jurisdictions	transfer	law	to	participating	states,	including	power	as	highlighted	in	




















ranging	 analysis	 of	 how	 this	 international	 system	 interacts	with	 domestic	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	
global	 regulatory	 process.	 As	 Yackee	 explains,	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 (and	 investment	
chapters	 in	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 trade	 agreements)	 generally	 protect	 foreign	 investors	
against	expropriations	and	regulatory	takings	by	establishing	principles	of	non-discrimination	and	
fair	treatment	and	by	giving	foreign	investors	the	right	to	sue	states	in	ad	hoc	arbitral	tribunals.	
In	 recent	 years,	 investment	 treaties	 have	 also	 been	 used	 by	 the	 United	 States	 to	 transplant	
administrative	 law	 to	other	 countries,	 in	particular	 the	pluralist	 rulemaking	procedure	 that	 is	
considered	 earlier	 in	 the	 volume.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 potentially	 far-reaching	
consequences	of	 investor–state	dispute	resolution	for	domestic	regulation,	there	have	been	a	
number	 of	 constructive	 efforts	 to	 design	 a	 better	 legal	 framework	 for	 international	 arbitral	
tribunals.	These	include	enhanced	transparency	and	third-party	participation	in	investor–state	
arbitrations.	 Overall,	 Yackee	 is	 cautious	 in	 his	 assessment	 of	 these	 many	 developments.	
Domestically,	 because	 of	 the	 legal	 obstacles	 to	 reception	 noted	 earlier,	 he	 is	 skeptical	 that	














established	 by	 treaty,	 but	 rather	 are	 created	 and	 operate	 pursuant	 to	 memoranda	 of	
understanding	 and	 other	 low-level	 agreements	 between	 national	 regulatory	 agencies;	 their	


















in	 federal	 systems	 like	 Germany	 and	 the	 United	 States.	 This	 structure	 of	 EU	 regulatory	
cooperation	 has	 been	 criticized	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 undermines	 the	 accountability	 and	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process.	 Hofmann	 concludes	 that	 the	 accountability	 challenge	 is	
serious	 indeed,	 in	 part	 because	 legal	 prescription	 based	on	 comparison	does	 not	 have	much	
purchase	over	the	complex	realities	of	EU	governance.	In	domestic	jurisdictions,	the	principal–










jurisdiction	 in	 global	 disaster	 regulation.	 The	 explanation	 for	 the	 low	 level	 of	 international	
cooperation	in	the	disaster	area	is	twofold:	the	domestic	foundations	are	underdeveloped	since	
many	countries,	even	wealthy	ones	 such	as	 Japan,	 lack	a	 robust	 legal	 framework	 for	disaster	
relief;	internationally,	especially	with	respect	to	natural	disasters,	countries	lack	a	shared	sense	
of	 reciprocal	 risk	 because	 the	 harms	 are	 often	 believed	 to	 be	 non-human	 in	 origin	 and	
geographically	 restricted.	 Feldman	 and	 Fish	 conclude	 that	 the	 best	 disaster	 relief	 programs	






The	 contemporary	 regulatory	 process	 is	 global.	 Markets	 and	 the	 problems	 they	 generate—
consumer	tracking,	parabens	safety,	and	many	others—cross	borders	and	so	too	do	regulatory	
efforts	to	address	those	problems.	As	national	sovereignty	recedes	and	markets	and	jurisdictions	
become	 increasingly	 interdependent,	 the	 high-stakes	 game	 of	 regulation	 is	 no	 longer	 being	
played	within	the	confines	of	the	state	and	the	law	of	single	nations.	A	plurality	of	jurisdictions	
and	 regulatory	 bodies	 are	 called	 into	 action,	 sometimes	 in	 concert	 but	 just	 as	 often	 in	
competition.	












captured	 by	 classifications	 based	 on	 paradigms	 of	 public	 law	 and	 models	 of	 public–private	
relations.	The	question	of	whether	and	how	convergence	occurs	should	be	studied	using	causal	












The	 chapters	 in	 this	 book	 afford	 a	 vital	 demonstration	 of	 what	 is	 to	 be	 gained	 by	
establishing	 a	 new	 field	 of	 inquiry.	 They	 show	 the	 value,	 for	 the	 various	 political	 and	 legal	
operators	engaged	in	the	global	regulatory	process,	of	presenting	and	analyzing	in	a	single	work	













manifold	 topics	 and	 jurisdictions.	 This	 book	 covers	 some	 of	 the	most	 important	 ones,	 but	 a	
number	 of	 others	 have	 been	 left	 to	 future	 research	 endeavors.	 	 Likewise,	 the	 avenues	 of	
theoretical	 inquiry	 that	 are	 central	 to	 the	 field	 are	 complex	 and	 will	 require	 sustained	
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Formally	 equal	 rights	 of	 private	
participation,	 i.e.,	 notice-and-comment	
rulemaking	




• No	 legal	 recognition	 of	 specific	
private	 bodies	 in	 public	
regulatory	schemes	




• Legal	 recognition	 of	 private	
bodies	 in	 public	 regulatory	
schemes	
• Balanced	 representation	 in	













European	 Union,	 European	 countries,	





















Classifications	 based	 on	 the	
following	categories:		
• paradigms	 of	 public	 law:	









legal	 transplants	 with	 emphasis	
on:	
• power	 imbalance	 as	 a	
mode	of	legal	transfer;	
• paradigms	 of	 public	 law	
and	 public–private	








• no	 presumption	 of	 similarity	
when	assessing	legal	solutions;	
• if	 different	 solutions:	 explicitly	
posit	 attributes	 of	 “better”	 law	
and	investigate	empirically	which	
jurisdiction’s	law	possesses	such	
attributes		
